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ETHICS AND INTERNAL AUDIT: WHISTLEBLOWING ISSUES Bunget, Ovidiu-Constantin and Abstract: It is undisputed that the companies’ performances are now more than ever,in the concerns caused by global competition and financial crisis. In this context, one of the interveners in the direction of performance is having an ethical and responsable behavior regrading the public. An ethical behavioris related first of all to the idea of morality, above respecting the law. Ethics aims to the heart of the corporate’s reputation and in the end that is all you have if you hope to be successful and prosperous in the business world (Harold Tinkler-director of ethics departament of Deloitte & Touche). Developing a system of ethical values within an organization depends not only on the framework provided by the law, but also by creating a participatory framework in order to eliminate waste, or other forms of fraud.Whistleblowing („who blows the whistle”) which can be translated by „giving signals” means that employees can be a part of the internal structures ofcompanies with duties of discovering non-ethical practices. Whistleblowing policy is the result of implementation by U.S. firms which are present in other states, of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in the U.S. What these companies do not realize is that the implementation of whistleblowing schemes in Romania can be interpreted as a violation of the rights of data subjects to personaldata protection.
Keywords: company, ethics, internal audit, whistleblowing
(SRS-048-JEL classification: M42, Paper No. 17312, posted 15. September 2009 ) INTERNAL AUDIT APPROACH IN BANKS Professor (PhD) of Management Information Systems FAMILY OWNERSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE : EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM WESTERN EUROPEAN CORPORATIONS Benjamin Maury ABSTRACT
This paper empirically examines how family-controlled firms perform in relation to firms with nonfamily controlling shareholders in Western Europe. The sample consists of 1672 non-financial firms. Active family control is associated with higher profitability compared to nonfamily firms, whereas passive family control does not affect profitability. Active family control continues to outperform nonfamily control in terms of profitability in different legal regimes. Active and passive family control is associated with higher firm valuations, but the premium is mainly due to economies with high shareholder protection. The benefits from family control occur in nonmajority held firms. These results suggest that family control lowers the agency problem between owners and managers, but gives rise to conflicts between the family and minority shareholders when shareholder protection is low and control is high. Keywords: Family firms; Ownership structure; Corporate governance (SRS-046, Journal of Corporate Finance12 (2006) 321–341, D 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: G3; G32) |
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